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ABSTRACT 
Cross-Border Mergers and Strategic Trade Policy with Two-Part Taxation: 
Is International Policy Coordination Beneficial?  
by Kjell Erik Lommerud, Trond E. Olsen and Odd Rune Straume  
We analyse how national taxation of firms are likely to affect merger incentives 
in international markets. In particular, we ask whether non-coordinated trade 
policies stimulate cross-border mergers that are overall inefficient, and if this is 
then an argument for international coordination of such policies? We address 
this issue in a setting where policy makers use two-part tariffs to tax exporting 
firms. The analysis reveals that while non-coordinated policies may induce 
cross-border mergers (by allowing the firms in question to play national policy 
makers out against each other), this can nevertheless be overall welfare 
enhancing compared to market outcomes under coordinated policy making. 
 
Keywords: Strategic trade policy, two-part taxation, endogenous merger, policy 
coordination 
JEL Classification: F13, L13, L41, L50 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Grenzüberschreitende Fusionen und strategische Handelspolitik mit 
zweiseitiger Besteuerung: Ist eine internationale Koordination sinnvoll?  
Das Papier untersucht die möglichen Wirkungen der nationalen Besteuerung 
auf Anreize für Fusionen in internationalen Märkten. Dabei wird vor allem 
gefragt, ob unkoordinierte Handelspolitik zu grenzüberschreitenden Fusionen 
führt, die insgesamt ineffizient sind und ob das für die internationale Koordina-
tion der Handelspolitik spricht. Im vorgestellten Modellrahmen nutzen Politik-
entscheider zweiseitige Zölle um Exportfirmen zu besteuern. Die Untersuchung 
zeigt, dass zwar nichtkoordinierte Politik grenzüberschreitende Fusionen 
hervorbringt, indem die beteiligten Firmen ihre nationalen Gesetzgeber gegen-
einander ausspielen können; allerdings ist das Ergebnis durchaus wohlfahrts-
steigernd im Vergleich zu dem Marktergebnis, das sich aus koordinierter 
Handelspolitik ergibt. 
1 Introduction
Governments regulate and tax private firms in many ways. If the total burden of taxation
and regulation is too large, firms have an incentive to move their business elsewhere. Tax
competition among countries may be the result, and many fear a race to the bottom in
corporate taxation and think that international policy cooperation is called for.
This paper concerns itself with one particular way that firms might flee from the
jurisdiction of a given government, namely by international merger. When operating in
several countries, production can often easily be increased in one country and reduced
in another, according to where the regulatory regime is more lax. We present a model
where firms in fact have incentives to choose international over domestic merger due to
anticipated taxation. We ask whether this warrants international policy cooperation, and
identify circumstances under which the perhaps surprising answer is ‘no’. The ‘national
champion’ argument — that national governments should try to promote national mergers
rather than international ones — seem popular among policy makers in many countries,
and there is an upstart theoretical economic literature that seeks to investigate if such
national champion policies can be warranted.1 The punchline here, which is novel relative
to this literature, is that there can indeed be forces other than eﬃciency reasons that
steer companies towards international merger solutions — because this gives a strategic
advantage as regards national tax authorities — but that international policy coordination
that would remove such ‘wrong’ incentives for international mergers nevertheless may not
be the right answer to the problem. However, when choosing whether or not to coordinate
policies, authorities do in eﬀect choose between international mergers and a decentralised
market structure. This policy option cannot be used in the current setting to pursue a
national champion policy of domestic mergers.
A main feature of the model is that governments have access to two-part tariﬀs when
taxing firms: they can both use a uniform tax/subsidy per unit, while at the same time
employing a fixed tax element unrelated to output, that in principle also can be positive
or negative. In the current context, with a Cournot oligopoly, a government will — at least
in the absence of policy coordination — tend to subsidise its national firms on a per unit
1Papers that are related to the cross-country versus international mergers debate include Barros (1994),
Bjorvatn (2004), Haufler and Nielsen (2005), Head and Ries (1997), Horn and Levinsohn (2001), Horn and
Persson (2001b), Lommerud, Straume and Sørgard (2006), Neary (2003), Norbäck and Persson (2006),
Qiou and Zhou (2006), Richardson (1999), Saggi and Yildiz (2006), Straume (2003) and Südekum (2006).
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basis, to gain international market shares, while the lump-sum tax element will be used to
shift profit from firms to government. The link to the strategic trade literature should be
obvious. For concreteness, think of natural gas as an example. In this industry, a handful
of companies in two or three countries are the main suppliers to the European market.
Governments can tax away profits lump-sum in several ways, for example by selling gas
leases lump-sum or by charging large lump-sum fees for the use of the transportation
infrastructure that firms need to use in order to reach the market. The temptation to
subsidise exports to win national market shares in the ‘third country’ where customers
reside is of course only strengthened by the fact that any profits in the domestic firms can
be confiscated through the lump-sum fee.
We believe that governments have many ways to influence firm profits in a lump-sum
manner. Take as a further example environmental standards. Firms will first have to invest
fixed costs in complying with environmental standards — then production takes place, and
can in principle be taxed or subsidised per unit. This is also a two-part tax scheme, and
the cost of compliance with the given standard typically can be viewed as a lump-sum
tax element. Many other examples can be found where government requirements indeed
inflict a lump-sum tax that firms must meet before they can gain a ‘license to operate’ in
a given market. For example, broadcasters and telecom firms find that entry allowances
sell at enormous prices, perhaps decided through auctions.
The basic story of the paper can be outlined as follows. At the outset there are
two countries each with two domestic firms. Any two-firm merger is allowed, but not
mergers involving three or all four firms. A merger will lead to fixed cost synergies, but
also influence how firms compete in the (Cournot) market. The merger decision is taken
before taxes are set, but firms know whether international policy coordination will take
place or not. One attraction of choosing a cross-border merger is that the firm then has
the leverage to scale production up or down in the two countries, if the tax regime makes
this warranted. At a second stage, governments announce tax variables. At this point
in time the merger decision is already undertaken, so the focus of the authorities will be
on how taxation aﬀects their domestic firms (or the domestic parts of international firms)
in the Cournot market game that takes place subsequent to taxation. However, taxation
will be anticipated by firms, so in this way the tax variables can influence the merger
decision. With international cooperation on policy the lump-sum tax and the per-unit
subsidy will be set so as to maximise the cartel profit. However, this cartel profit will be
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fully confiscated by the governments through the lump-sum tax. With cooperative policy
no merger will be profitable, which means that the positive fixed cost synergies associated
with merger are lost. With non-cooperative regulation, cross-border mergers stand a
chance of rescuing some profits, precisely because international firms have some leverage
to react to taxation by shifting production elsewhere, which can discipline the confiscation
of profits through the lump-sum tax element. We discuss which mergers will be socially
preferred by domestic social planners and whether policy coordination will be beneficial
seen through the eyes of such planners. Without going in detail, policy coordination can
turn out to be unwanted — this depends on how important it is to harvest at least some
merger synergies relative to what can be achieved by the two producer countries in cashing
in on their market power in the ‘third country’ where consumers reside.
Many strands of the economics research literature are relevant for the model developed
here. The theory of the interaction among tax regimes in various countries basically comes
in two variants. The tax competition literature focuses on governments that want to raise
money for example by taxing companies, but who fear that capital may flee to low-tax
havens. The strategic trade literature, on the other hand, focuses on national governments
that want to use tax and regulation instruments to help domestic firms win market shares
abroad.
In the tax competition literature, Kehoe’s well-known 1989-paper was among the first
to point out that the lack of international policy coordination can in fact be beneficial be-
cause it alleviates hold-up problems associated with taxation.2 Kehoe uses a model where
the consumption/savings decision is undertaken first, then taxes are set, then individuals
determine their labor supply and which country to invest their savings in. The fact that
taxes are set before investments take place can be interpreted as the governments being
able to commit long-term to a level of taxation. Kehoe’s contribution is therefore solidly
placed in the tax competition literature. The commitment possibility for a government
in our analysis is restricted to the choice to enter into policy coordination, which is a
less limiting assumption. Moreover, as far as we know, our paper is the first one that
points out that an unbeneficial-policy-coordination result can apply also in a strategic
trade model. Two-part taxation is essential for this. Lack of policy coordination acts as a
quasi-commitment not to be too heavy-handed on the lump-sum tax instrument — which
2Kehoe’s article is related to Kydland and Prescott (1980). An example of more recent relevant work
is Andersson and Konrad (2003).
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a strategic trade type of policy maker otherwise would tend to use to recoup some of the
cost of the export subsidies.3
As mentioned, the model used here falls squarely within the strategic trade bracket.
Taxes are set before firms compete in a Cournot oligopoly, so the tax instruments can
potentially influence the behaviour of domestic firms in a way that wins them a larger
international market share.4 The paper in this tradition that perhaps lies closest to us is
Huck and Konrad (2004). These authors find that active strategic trade policy can lead
firms to choose national over international mergers because this triggers higher per-unit
subsidies of production.5 There are many diﬀerences between this work and our own
model. Importantly, we allow governments to use a two-part tax scheme. This takes
away the attraction of national mergers for firms: even though they could spur increased
strategic per-unit subsidies, this benefit would be confiscated through an increase in the
lump-sum tax element. Moreover, a central focus in our paper is how possible merger
choices influence the benefits from international policy coordination, something which is
not an issue in Huck and Konrad.6
Another set of papers in the strategic trade literature are also highly relevant in our
context. In a series of papers, Leahy and Neary (1996, 1997, 1999, 2000) have studied how
various assumptions on government commitment ability influence results in strategic trade
settings.7 The models are made temporal for example by assuming that R&D investments
or learning-by-doing takes place in the first of two periods. In all of this work the policy
3We would like to mention a few further articles from the tax competition literature. Janeba (2000)
presents a model where firms first build up capacities in one or more countries, then taxes are set, then
outputs are chosen. Excessive production capacity built up in more than one country gives a firm some
leverage if taxation should be too high. This has some resemblance to our point that cross-border merger
also gives some ex post leverage to firms, but there are numerous diﬀerences between the present work and
Janeba’s model. Olsen and Osmundsen (2001, 2003) discuss national ownership questions in a framework
of tax competition. From the large literature on investment and expropriation risk, we mention Eaton and
Gersovitz (1983, 1984), Svejnar and Smith (1984), Thomas and Worrall (1994), Schnitzer (1999), Erbenova
and Vagstad (1999), Konrad and Lommerud (2001) and Kessing, Konrad and Kotsogiannis (2006).
4Pioneering contributions on strategic trade policy were Brander and Spencer (1985) and Eaton and
Grossman (1986). See Brander (1995) for an overview.
5Dixit (1984) can be seen as a forerunner of some aspects of the Huck-Konrad analysis.
6Dick (1993) studies the related theme of cross-ownership in a strategic trade model. Nese and Straume
(2006) analyse how national regulators can use tax instruments strategically to shift rents among diﬀerent
parts of a successive international oligopoly, but merger is not an issue.
7See also Gruenspecht (1988) and Zigic (2003).
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instrument is a uniform subsidy rate — there is no mention of two-part taxation. In our
framework it is precisely two-part taxation that can make policy coordination (which can
be seen as a commitment instrument) unwanted even though government subsidies can be
committed to before merger decisions are taken.
There are close structural similarities between the model presented here and the rel-
atively large literature on mergers in vertical structures. Examples of this line of work
include Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Inderst and Wey (2003), Lommerud, Straume and Sør-
gard (2005, 2006) and O’Brien and Shaﬀer (2005). The production firms in the model can
be seen as ‘downstream’ firms that supply to a market, while the tax authorities will be
‘upstream’ input suppliers (supplying ‘access’ or ‘licence to operate’). The present model
adds to this literature on several counts. Firstly, the upstream agents are here regulators
that have a broader objective function than profit-maximising input suppliers. Secondly,
many of the mentioned articles only study the consequences of downstream mergers —
while we look at the possibility of diﬀerent types of downstream mergers and how such
mergers can influence upstream cooperation. Thirdly, we allow upstream agents to use
two-part tariﬀs.8
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. The model is presented in Section
2. Section 3 studies the baseline case of merger incentives in the case of international
policy cooperation. A corresponding analysis of non-cooperative regulation is found in
Section 4. Section 5 uses an endogenous merger model to predict what mergers will take
place in the equilibrium market structure under diﬀerent assumptions about the regulatory
regime. Section 6 is devoted to social welfare issues. After asking what types of mergers are
socially desirable under cooperative or non-cooperative policies, we turn to the question
if international policy cooperation would be beneficial. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Model
Consider an industry with initially four single-plant firms located in two countries; firms
(plants) 1 and 2 are located in country A, whereas firms (plants) 3 and 4 are located in
country B.9 The firms produce a homogenous good which is exported to a third country.
8Two-part tariﬀs are considered also in Ziss (1995), Milliou and Petrakis (2005) and Symeonidis (2005),
but the link between endogenous downstream mergers and upstream cooperation is not made.
9Regarding notation, we use the indices j and i for countries and plants, respectively, while the set of
plants located in country j is given by Nj . We will also intermittently use subscript −j to denote the
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We assume that the firms compete á la Cournot in the export market.
Third-market demand for the good is given by an inverse demand function
p = a− b
4X
i=1
qi, (1)
where p is the market-clearing price and qi is quantity supplied from plant i. The variable
cost of production at each plant is given by the convex cost functionC (qi).10 For simplicity,
we let this function take on a simple quadratic form: C (qi) = c2q
2
i . The firms must also
incur a firm-specific fixed cost K. In the decentralised market structure, with no mergers,
profits of firm i, located in country j, are then given by
πi = (p− wj) qi −C (qi)−K − Tj , i ∈ Nj , (2)
where wj and Tj denote, respectively, the variable and fixed part of a two-part tariﬀ levied
by the policy maker in country j.
National policy makers are concerned about maximising national welfare, which — in
the absence of domestic consumers — is assumed to be given by a weighted sum of public
revenue and private profits. In the decentralised market structure, national welfare in
country j is given by
Wj = 2Tj + wj
X
i∈Nj
qi + α
X
i∈Nj
πi, α < 1. (3)
The assumption that α is strictly less than one implies that the policy maker will extract
all private profits if she is costlessly able to do so.
We consider the following game:
Stage 0: The policy makers in country A and B decide whether or not to set up an
institution for coordinated policy making on corporate taxation and trade policy.
Stage 1: The firms decide whether to merge domestically or cross-border, if at all.
Stage 2: The national policy makers set two-part tariﬀs, wj and Tj .
Stage 3: The firms choose outputs simultaneously and non-cooperatively.
other country than j. Finally, where appropriate, we use superscripts d and c for market structures with
domestic and cross-border mergers, respectively.
10Transportation costs are assumed to be included in the cost function C (·).
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Placing the merger decisions before the tax variables are set, reflects the fact that
mergers are long-term decisions with a considerable degree of commitment involved. For
clarity of analysis, we restrict attention to two-firm mergers. We also assume that there is
a private cost ε > 0 of merging, related to the organizational adjustments needed in order
to implement the merger. A strictly positive merger cost is suﬃcient to ensure equilibrium
selection in the merger game; however, for simplicity, we assume that ε is infinitesimally
small so that it can be dropped from the equilibrium expressions derived in the subsequent
sections.
In order to illustrate the main workings of the model, we start out by characterising
the equilibria in all symmetrical market structures under diﬀerent policy regimes. We then
proceed to make predictions about the equilibrium market structure of the full game.
3 Cooperative policy making
As a benchmark for comparison, we start out by considering the case where trade policies
are harmonised across borders. In the decentralised market structure, profit maximising
output quantities are given by
qi∈Nj =
a (b+ c)− (3b+ c)wj + 2bw−j
(5b+ c) (b+ c)
. (4)
Maximisation of global welfare implies that the per-unit tariﬀ must satisfy the first-order
conditions
∂ (WA +WB)
∂wj
= 0, (5)
while the lump-sum tariﬀ must be set so that the participation constraints are satisfied:
πi ≥ 0. (6)
Solving (5) and (6), assuming that the participation constraints hold with equality,
and taking into account that the choice of wj aﬀects the optimal choice of Tj , we derive
the optimal two-part tariﬀ:
wj =
3ab
8b+ c
, (7)
Tj =
(2b+ c) a2
2 (8b+ c)2
−K. (8)
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We observe that optimal taxation involves setting a positive per-unit tariﬀ, wj > 0. This
is done to correct for the negative competition externality in the product market. By
cooperative policy making, the cartel output — which maximises joint profits — can be
implemented. Private profits can then be fully extracted through the fixed tariﬀ Tj ,
leaving the firms with zero profits in equilibrium.
3.1 Mergers
Focusing on two-firm mergers, we consider the cases where the firms in the industry merge
either domestically or cross-border, implying that the number of firms is reduced from 4
to 2. We assume that a merger entails a cost synergy, which takes the form of fixed-cost
savings,11 and we also allow for the possibility that the size of these fixed-cost savings
depends on whether the merger is domestic or cross-border. More specifically, we assume
that cost savings in a domestic and cross-border merger, respectively, are θdK and θcK,
where θd, θc ∈ (0, 1).
In the case of domestic mergers, profits for the merged firms are given by
π1+2 = (p−wA) (q1 + q2)−C (q1)−C (q2)− (2− θd)K − TA, (9)
π3+4 = (p− wB) (q3 + q4)−C (q3)−C (q4)− (2− θd)K − TB, (10)
from which we can derive optimal outputs in the Cournot game:
qdi∈Nj =
a (2b+ c)− wj (4b+ c) + 2bw−j
(2b+ c) (6b+ c)
. (11)
In the case of cross-border mergers, on the other hand, profits in one of the two possible
ownership structures are given by
π1+3 = (p− wA) q1 + (p− wB) q3 − C (q1)−C (q3)− (2− θc)K − TA − TB, (12)
π2+4 = (p− wA) q2 + (p− wB) q4 − C (q2)−C (q4)− (2− θc)K − TA − TB. (13)
Profit-maximising outputs are found to be
qci∈Nj =
ac−wj (3b+ c) + 3bw−j
c (6b+ c)
. (14)
11The main mechanisms of the model, and thus our main results, does not particularly depend on the
source of merger synergies. Fixed cost savings are thus chosen for analytical simplicity.
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When analysing optimal trade policy we make the assumption that, in the case of cross-
border mergers, profits are divided equally between share-holders in the two countries.12
With cross-border policy harmonisation, the policy makers are always able to implement
the full cartel output and extract all profits in equilibrium. Per-unit tariﬀs are equal
regardless of the type of merger, and given by
wdj = wcj =
2ab
8b+ c
. (15)
Comparing (7) and (15), we observe that a more concentrated market structure implies a
lower per-unit tariﬀ, as we would expect. The fixed tariﬀ, on the other hand, depends on
the size of merger synergies:
T dj =
(4b+ c) a2
(8b+ c)2
− (2− θd) , (16)
T cj =
1
2
½
(4b+ c) a2
(8b+ c)2
− (2− θc)
¾
. (17)
4 Non-cooperative policy making
Now we consider the case where national policy makers set tariﬀs simultaneously and
non-cooperatively. We start out by analysing the policy game in the decentralised market
structure.
Equilibrium tariﬀs must satisfy
∂Wj
∂wj
= 0, (18)
and
πi ≥ 0. (19)
Using (4), equilibrium tariﬀs are given by
wj =
ab (c− b)
(c+ 7b) (2b+ c)
, (20)
Tj =
(3b+ c)2 a2
2 (2b+ c) (c+ 7b)2
−K. (21)
12 In other words, half of the total profits generated in an internationally merged firm enters the objective
function of a domestic policy maker. It should be stressed, though, that the main thrust of the analysis
does not depend on a particular sharing rule.
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In the absence of international coordination, national policy makers must now balance
two opposing incentives when framing the optimal policies. One the one hand, national
policy makers have incentives to use per-unit tariﬀs to correct for a negative externality
between domestic competitors, moving the market equilibrium closer to the cartel outcome.
One the other hand, there is also an incentive to use the per-unit tariﬀ as a strategic trade
policy instrument. By lowering wj from the cooperative equilibrium level, the policy
maker in country j can ensure — all else equal — that a larger share of the export market
is served by the firms located in j. Since outputs are strategic substitutes in the product
market game, this is a profitable deviation.13 Consequently, the equilibrium level of wj is
lower when policy making is not internationally coordinated.14 The relative strengths of
these opposing incentives are determined by the degree of convexity in production costs,
measured by the parameter c. Strategic trade policy is more eﬀective when c is low. Thus,
a lower c increases rent-shifting incentives and leads to a lower equilibrium value of wj .
From (20) we see that the optimal policy entails an export subsidy — i.e., wj < 0 — if c < b.
Domestic mergers
Solving (18) and (19) by using (11), equilibrium tariﬀs when firms merge domestically
are given by
wdj =
−4b2a
10bc+ 20b2 + c2
, (22)
T dj =
(4b+ c)3 a2
(10bc+ 20b2 + c2)2
− (2− θd)K. (23)
Policy makers are still able to extract all private profits.
The previously discussed negative externality on domestic competitors is now fully
internalised by the firms themselves through mergers. Thus, when the market structure is
characterised by national monopolies, only rent-shifting incentives matter for the choice of
per-unit tariﬀs in the non-cooperative policy game. Consequently, domestic mergers lead
to lower equilibrium levels of wj . Indeed, from (22) we see that the policy makers will
always choose to subsidise exports in equilibrium.
13See, e.g., Brander and Spencer (1985).
14This is easily confirmed by a comparison of (7) and (20).
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Cross-border mergers
Cross-border mergers increase the flexibility of the merging parties, in the sense that
a merged firm can choose to serve the export market from both or either of the exporting
countries. Under non-cooperative policy making, this flexibility serves as a credible threat
vis-á-vis national policy makers. The policy maker in country j must now make sure that
she oﬀers a tariﬀ that discourages the internationally merged firms to re-locate all export
production to the other country.
Let bπm (j) denote the profits earned by the merged firm m when serving the export
market only from country j (given that the other firm uses both plants for export produc-
tion). Optimal taxation in the non-cooperative regime must now also satisfy the following
mobility constraint for each merged firm:
πm ≥ bπm (j) . (24)
It is straightforward to derive
bπm (j) = ((2b+ c) a− (c+ 3b)wj + bw−j)2 (2b+ c)
2 (6b2 + c2 + 6bc)2
− (2− θc)K − Tj . (25)
On the other hand, if the merged firms serve the export market from both countries,
equilibrium profits are found by inserting (14) into (12) or (13), and given by
πm =
2ca (4b+ c) (a− wA − wB) + η
2c (6b+ c)2
− (2− θc)K − TA − TB, (26)
where
η :=
¡
8bc+ 18b2 + c2
¢ ¡
w2A +w2B
¢
− 4bwAwB (9b+ 2c) > 0.
Applying the mobility constraints, equilibrium tariﬀs in the non-cooperative regime
with cross-border mergers are given by15
wcj =
abc
¡
αν + 24b3 (3b+ 2c)− 8c2b (b+ c)− c4
¢
αcbν − (2b+ c)' , (27)
T cj =
ca2 (c+ 3b)2 γ
¡
6b2 + c2 + 6bc
¢2
2 (αcbν − (2b+ c)')2
, (28)
where
γ := c4 + 14bc3 + 72b2c2 + 160b3c+ 120b4,
15Explicit expressions for the mobility constraints are given in Appendix A.
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ν := c4 + 12bc3 + 52b2c2 + 102b3c+ 72b4,
' := 324b5 + 612b4c+ 444b3c2 + 142b2c3 + 20bc4 + c5.
We can now state our first main result:16
Proposition 1 Under non-cooperative policy making, there exists a critical value K such
that cross-border mergers yield positive profits in equilibrium if K < K.
Unless fixed costs are suﬃciently high, non-cooperative policy makers are not able
to extract all rents from internationally merged firms in equilibrium. This is due to the
merged firms’ ability to play the national policy makers out against each other. By credibly
threatening to shift export production to a foreign plant, an internationally merged firm
can induce each national policy maker to oﬀer a tariﬀ that in eﬀect will leave the firm
with positive profits in equilibrium.17
However, the equilibrium outcome given by (27)-(28) is valid only if fixed costs are not
too high. If K is above the critical level K, the policy makers can extract all profits in
the non-cooperative equilibrium without violating the mobility constraint. In this case,
the internationally merged firms do not obtain any strategic advantage from the merger.
It is easily shown that K is increasing in the cost-savings factor θ.18 Thus, larger merger
synergies increase the likelihood of profitable cross-border mergers; not because of the
synergies themselves, but because larger synergies make the the threat of production
shifting credible for a larger range of K.
When all private profits are not extracted, it also follows that the weight attached to
profits in the policy makers’ objective functions matters for the equilibrium tariﬀ. From
(27) it is easily confirmed that wcj is decreasing in α.
5 Equilibrium market structure
What is the equilibrium market structure if we allow for all possible two-firm mergers? In
order to make predictions about merger formation, we apply the endogenous merger model
16All formal proofs are presented in Appendix C.
17We have assumed that merger synergies and fixed costs are independent of whether the merged firms
use both plants (see (25)). If the merged firms could save some fixed costs by using only one plant, the
national policy makers would have to leave even more profits to the firms in order to meet the mobility
constraints.
18See Appendix C.
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introduced by Horn and Persson (2001a), who treat the merger process as a cooperative
game of coalition-formation, where the players are free to communicate and write binding
contracts.19
To introduce some more notation, let an ownership structure Mk be a partition of the
set {1, 2, 3, 4} of owners (firms) into coalitions. Allowing only for two-firm mergers, there
are 5 possible market structures, comprising a total of 10 diﬀerent ownership structures.
For example, the market structure with two cross-border mergers can be realised through
two diﬀerent ownership structures: {1 + 3, 2 + 4} and {1 + 4, 2 + 3}. Without going into
details about the theoretical foundations of the merger formation model, the approach
involves a comparison of any two possible ownership structures Mk and Mk0 , where Mk
is said to dominate Mk0 if the combined profits of the decisive group of owners are larger
in Mk than in Mk0 . The decisive group of owners are the owners that are expected to be
able to influence whether Mk will be formed instead of Mk0 , and vice versa. We do not
allow side-payments among coalitions, so owners belonging to identical coalitions in the
two structures cannot aﬀect whether Mk will be formed instead of Mk0 , but all remaining
owners can influence this choice and are thus decisive.20 Finally, the solution concept is
the core. Those structures that are in the core (i.e., the structures that are undominated)
are defined as equilibrium ownership structures.
Let us now turn to the solution of the full game. Under cooperative policy making,
private profits are always fully extracted in equilibrium. Due to the private cost of merger
(ε > 0), the decentralised market structure strictly dominates all other market structures,
and, consequently, no mergers will take place when trade policies are internationally co-
ordinated.
Under non-cooperative policy making, on the other hand, we have shown that firms
can obtain positive profits by merging cross-border. Thus, if K < K, the symmetric
market structure with two cross-border mergers strictly dominates both the decentralised
structure and any market structure involving domestic mergers. However, it is not a priori
clear whether a market structure with only a single cross-border merger is dominated
by the market structure where all firms merge cross-border. This dominance relation is
19Due to the nature of our model, similar results would be obtained in any plausible model of endogenous
mergers. Since the decentralised market structure implies zero profits in equilibrium, a merger can never
harm non-participating firms. This implies that there are no incentives for ‘pre-emptive mergers’ in our
model.
20See Horn and Persson (2001a) for a formal definition of decisive owners.
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determined by whether a second cross-border merger is privately profitable. This depends
firstly on whether or not taxation is discriminatory. With discriminatory taxation, it is
always possible to extract all profits from the non-merged firms. In this case, a second
cross-border merger is always privately profitable. Under non-discriminatory taxation, on
the other hand, the non-merged firms benefit from the laxer tax regime induced by a single
cross-border merger. This free-rider eﬀect may be suﬃciently strong to prevent a second
merger.
Proposition 2 (i) Under cooperative policy making, there are no mergers in equilibrium.
(ii) Under non-cooperative, discriminatory tax polices, the equilibrium market structure
is two cross-border mergers if K < K.
(iii) Under non-cooperative, non-discriminatory tax policies, if θc > eθ ∈ (0, 1), there
exists a critical value eK < K such that the equilibrium market structure is two cross-border
mergers if K ∈
³ eK,K´.
Part (iii) of the Proposition basically states that, with non-discriminatory taxation,
private profitability of a second cross-border merger requires a certain amount of merger
synergies. Otherwise, the aggressive response of the already merged firm will make a
second merger unprofitable, as in a ‘standard’ Cournot homogenous goods oligopoly.
6 Social welfare
In this section we discuss two interrelated questions regarding social welfare. First, which
types of merger, if any at all, are preferred from a welfare point-of-view? Second, assuming
that merger decisions are endogenously made, is international harmonisation of trade
policies socially desirable? For the first question, we restrict attention to symmetric market
structures.
In the cooperative policy regime, a social ranking of market structures is straightfor-
ward. In any market structure, tariﬀs are set so that total industry rents are maximised.
Then the following result is trivially established:
Proposition 3 Under cooperative policy making, any mergers are socially desirable if
they yield some cost synergies. The socially most preferable market structure is the one in
which the largest merger synergies are realised.
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In the non-cooperative policy regime, things are far less straightforward. However, by
comparing the diﬀerent equilibrium welfare expressions reported in Appendix B, we can
establish the following results:
Proposition 4 Assume that policy making is non-cooperative.
(i) Compared with the decentralised structure, domestic mergers are always welfare
improving, while cross-border mergers are welfare improving if α or K is suﬃciently high.
(ii) Comparing domestic and cross-border mergers, and assuming that cost synergies
are identical in both types of merger, cross-border mergers are always socially preferred if
α is suﬃciently high, while domestic mergers are preferred if α and K are suﬃciently low.
Due to the rent-generating eﬀect of a more concentrated market structure, domestic
mergers are always welfare improving, even in the absence of cost synergies. On the
other hand, if firms merge cross-border, all pure profits cannot be extracted by the policy
makers. Consequently, the welfare eﬀect of cross-border mergers depends on how private
profits are evaluated. If α is suﬃciently high, there is a low social cost of leaving pure
profits in the hands of the firms, and cross-border mergers are always welfare improving
(relative to no mergers). In general, though, the welfare loss of not being able to extract
all rents must be weighed against the merger-induced increase in total rents. Thus, for
low levels of α it takes a suﬃciently high level of K to make cross-border mergers welfare
improving.
Finally, the welfare ranking of domestic versus cross-border mergers follows much the
same logic. If both types of merger are equal in terms of cost synergies, i.e., θd = θc, cross-
border mergers are preferred when α is suﬃciently high. Consider the limit α → 1. In
this case, there is no welfare cost of leaving positive profits in equilibrium and the welfare
ranking is fully explained by the eﬀect of diﬀerent types of merger on national policy
makers’ rent-shifting incentives. With domestic mergers, rent-shifting incentives cause
policy makers to subsidise exports, which reduces total industry rents. With cross-border
mergers, on the other hand, the Prisoners’ Dilemma characteristics of the non-cooperative
equilibrium are less pronounced, since the negative externality between domestic plants
(which are owned by diﬀerent firms) counteracts the national policy makers’ rent-shifting
incentives. This contributes to higher total industry profits in equilibrium, compared with
the case of domestic mergers.
The arguments in this subsection make it clear that the results regarding welfare
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comparisons are general, and not dependent on the particular functional forms used in the
analysis. The main reason for employing those special functional forms is to facilitate the
analysis in the next subsection, where one needs to examine whether it can be the case
that cross-border mergers are welfare improving (due to, say, large fixed costs K) and at
the same time leave rents to firms (which requires that fixed costs cannot be too large).
6.1 Is international policy coordination beneficial?
Let us now turn to the question of whether or not international harmonisation of trade
policies is desirable. The basic idea here is that diﬀerent policy regimes might imply
diﬀerent market structures in equilibrium. Assume that the countries can commit to a
particular policy regime at the outset of the game, before firms make their merger decisions.
In this case, we know that no mergers will be undertaken if policy making is transnationally
coordinated. If policies are not coordinated, however, there may be incentives for cross-
border mergers. We consider the case where the equilibrium market structure is two
cross-border mergers under non-cooperative policy making. From Proposition 2, we know
that this amounts to assuming either that trade policy is discriminatory and K < K, or
that eK < K < K.
In this case, the question of whether or not to coordinate policies across borders intro-
duces the following trade-oﬀ. Non-cooperative policy making implies that national policy
makers engage in a Prisoners’ Dilemma type of policy game, due to the incentives for
strategic trade policy. These incentives are eradicated by international harmonisation.
On the other hand, such harmonisation will remove private incentives for potentially wel-
fare improving mergers. An evaluation of this trade-oﬀ reduces to a comparison of welfare
in the non-cooperative policy regime with cross-border mergers and the cooperative regime
without mergers.
Proposition 5 If θc > θ∗ ∈ (0, 1), there exists a critical value K∗ < K such that inter-
national policy coordination is not beneficial for K ∈
¡
K∗,K
¢
.
In light of the welfare trade-oﬀ outlined above, the intuition behind this result is
straightforward. If merger synergies — in absolute terms — are suﬃciently high, the social
benefit of inducing welfare improving mergers outweigh the cost of the negative externali-
ties suﬀered in a non-harmonised policy regime. On the other hand K cannot be too large,
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because then the threat of shifting production between the plants in an internationally
merged firm is not eﬀective.
The relative magnitudes of the diﬀerent regimes can be illustrated by considering
a specific numerical example. Assume that a = 10, b = c = 1, and α = 0.8. This
yields θ∗ = 0.38. Thus, for any θ > 0.38 there is a possibility that international policy
coordination is not beneficial. Now assume that θ = 0.8. In this case, we have that
K∗ = 2.73 and K = 5.47, implying that policy coordination is not beneficial if K ∈
(2.73, 5.47). In this example and for K = 5 policy coordination yields welfare Wj = 1.11
while non-coordination yields welfare W cj = 3.47, implying that the latter alternative
allows a significant fraction of potential cost savings (θK = 4) to be realised and reflected
in improved welfare.
7 Concluding remarks
Many policy makers seem to view cross-border mergers with skepticism. We have investi-
gated one possible justification for such views: Cross-border merger allows firms to play
national policy makers out against each other, with higher retained profits as result.
Merger issues are typically studied in oligopoly models, and we have used a standard
Cournot setting with two firms in each of two countries, with consumers residing in a third
country. In this type of model, governments can gain from strategic trade type of policies,
to help national firms gaining market shares in the international market. We introduce
the possibility of two-part taxation. Output can be subsidised per unit, while profits at
the same time can be confiscated through a lump-sum tax element. This introduces a
hold-up problem of taxation also in a strategic trade framework. The particular problem
at hand is that heavy-handed use of the lump-sum tax element will scare oﬀ any up-front
sunk investment, such as mergers. Policy makers may want to commit not to use such
confiscatory taxation. The only commitment option oﬀered in this model is the possibility
to enter — or not to enter — into an agreement with the other country to coordinate tax
decisions. The absence of policy coordination means that some externalities in the strategic
trade game are left uninternalised — but on the upside at least some merger synergies can
be salvaged. Uncoordinated policy gives international firms, but only them, the option to
play tax authorities out against each other, due to the credible threat to move production
from one country to another.
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In tax theory, studies of non-linear taxation abound, but not so in strategic trade
theory. We have argued that two-part taxation is realistic in many oligopolistic markets.
Oil companies pay for exploration rights, gas producers sometimes pay for the use of
publicly owned transportation networks, broadcasters and telecoms pay for the right to
operate. Also, environmental and safety standards come close to lump-sum taxation. We
have assumed that it is possible to remove all pure profits through the lump-sum tax.
Assume to the contrary that there are some limits to how much lump-sum taxation can
be used. The necessary assumption is that lump-sum tax costs increase after a merger —
the firm will then weigh retained profits against mergers costs (that can be substantial).
The broad point remains valid — that lump-sum taxation reduces merger activity, and that
uncoordinated policy partly can correct for this while encouraging cross-border merger.
Results about unbeneficial policy cooperation typically arise in second-best settings.
Key ingredients here are that policy makers cannot influence merger decisions, but they
can choose whether or not to cooperate on policy. Naturally, it then becomes relevant
how the cooperation decision feeds back on private merger decisions. As a concluding
remark, assume the opposite: that international policy cooperation is not an option, but
policy makers can influence merger decisions, for example by subsidising domestic mergers
(presumably in some half-hidden way). A government could then correct for the lack of
merger incentives directly — and would perhaps want to encourage domestic mergers in
particular, for example because domestic mergers have larger synergies than international
ones. The national champion argument would then not be as irrational as it sometimes
is made out to be. However, we have described a second-best world where the national
authorities in reality have to chose between international mergers or none at all.
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A Mobility constraints under non-cooperative policy mak-
ing
Consider the case of two cross-border mergers. Using (25) and (26) from Section 4, the
mobility constraints for national policy makers can be expressed as
TA ≤
(ac− (c+ 3b)wA + 3bwB) (γac− βwA + φbwB)
2c (6b+ c)2 (6b2 + c2 + 6bc)2
, (A.1)
TB ≤
(ac− (c+ 3b)wB + 3bwA) (γac− βwB + φbwA)
2c (6b+ c)2 (6b2 + c2 + 6bc)2
, (A.2)
where
β := c5 + 17bc4 + 110b2c3 + 328b3c2 + 432b4c+ 216b5,
φ := 3c4 + 38bc3 + 168b2c2 + 312b3c+ 216b4,
and γ is defined in Section 4. By using (A.1)-(A.2) in the policy makers’ maximisation
problems, we derive (27) and (28), given in Section 4.
B Social welfare in the symmetric market structure equi-
libria
Using the equilibrium tariﬀs derived in the main body of the paper, equilibrium expres-
sions for social welfare in the symmetric market structures, under the two diﬀerent policy
regimes, are given as follows.
B.1 Coordinated policy making
No mergers:
Wj =
a2
8b+ c
− 2K. (B.1)
Domestic mergers:
W dj =
a2
8b+ c
− (2− θd)K. (B.2)
Cross-border mergers:
W cj =
a2
8b+ c
− (2− θc)K. (B.3)
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B.2 Non-cooperative policy making
No mergers:
Wj =
¡
7bc+ 4b2 + c2
¢
(3b+ c) a2
(7b+ c)2 (2b+ c)2
− 2K. (B.4)
Domestic mergers:
W dj =
¡
8bc+ 8b2 + c2
¢
(4b+ c) a2
(10bc+ 20b2 + c2)2
− (2− θd)K. (B.5)
Cross-border mergers:
W cj =
a2 (c+ 3b)
¡
6b2 + c2 + 6bc
¢2 ¡cχ+ 12αb3 (4b+ 3c) ¡9b2 + 6bc+ 2c2¢¢
(αcbν − (2b+ c)')2
(B.6)
−α (2− θc)K,
where
χ := c5 + 19bc4 + 6c3αb2 + 130b2c3 + 392b3c2 + 504b4c+ 216b5
and ν and ' have been defined in Section 4.
C Proofs
All proofs require only quite straightforward algebra. However, some of the algebra is
extremely detailed and thus omitted. In these cases, we only provide a main sketch of the
proof.21
C.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Inserting the equilibrium two-part tariﬀ, (27)-(28), into (26), equilibrium profits for an
internationally merged firm m, under non-cooperative policy making, is given by
πcm =
2a2bν (c+ 3b)2
¡
6b2 + c2 + 6bc
¢2
(αcbν − (2b+ c)')2
− (2− θc)K, (C.1)
where ν and ' are defined in Section 4. It follows straightforwardly that πcm > 0 ifK < K,
where
K :=
2a2bν (c+ 3b)2
¡
6b2 + c2 + 6bc
¢2
(2− θc) (αcbν − (2b+ c)')2
. (C.2)
For K > K, all profits are extracted through the lump-sum tax in equilibrium. Q.E.D.
21The ‘nitty gritty’ of the calculations are available from the authors upon request.
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C.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Given our assumptions about merger formation, parts (i) and (ii) of the Proposition follow
immediately from the analysis of Sections 3 and 4. To prove part (iii) of the Proposition,
we need to derive the equilibrium with a single cross-border merger. Assume that firms 1
and 3 merge. If the merged firms supply the good from both countries, profits are given
by
π1+3 =
2ac (4b+ c) (c+ b)2 (a− wA − wB) + (c+ 2b) δ
¡
w2A + w2B
¢
− 4bξwAwB
2c (c2 + 7cb+ 8b2)2
(C.3)
− (2− θc)K − TA − TB,
where
δ := c3 + 8bc2 + 21b2c+ 16b3,
ξ := 14bc2 + 27b2c+ 2c3 + 16b3,
Profits of the non-participating firms are given by
π2 =
(c+ 2b)
¡
a (c+ b) (c+ 2b)− wA
¡
c2 + 5b (c+ b)
¢
+ bwB (2c+ 3b)
¢2
2 (c+ b)2 (c2 + 7cb+ 8b2)2
(C.4)
−K − TA,
π4 =
(c+ 2b)
¡
a (c+ b) (c+ 2b)− wB
¡
c2 + 5b (c+ b)
¢
+ bwA (2c+ 3b)
¢2
2 (c+ b)2 (c2 + 7cb+ 8b2)2
(C.5)
−K − TB.
On the other hand, if the merged firm chooses to supply the good only from country j, it
will realise a profit of
bπ1+3 (j) = (2b+ c) (a (c+ b)− wj (c+ 2b) + w−jb)2
2 (c+ b)2 (c+ 4b)2
− (2− θc)K − Tj . (C.6)
Imposing the mobility conditions π1+3 ≥ bπ1+3 (j), equilibrium trade policy is characterised
by
wj =
abcρ
ψ
, (C.7)
Tj =
ϑ2
¡
64b4 + 102b3c+ 53c2b2 + 12c3b+ c4
¢
(4b+ c)2 a2c
2ψ2
, (C.8)
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where
ψ : = 2c6αb+ 25c5αb2 + 123c4αb3 + 305c3αb4 + 360c2αb5 + 160cαb6 − 2c7
−43c6b− 355c5b2 − 1472c4b3 − 3312b4c3 − 4000b5c2 − 2368b6c− 512b7,
ρ : = 2c5α+ 25αbc4 + 123αb2c3 + 305αb3c2 + 360αb4c
+160b5α− 3c5 − 32bc4 − 121b2c3 − 196b3c2 − 112b4c,
ϑ := 2c3 + 10bc2 + 13b2c+ 4b3.
Equilibrium profits are given by
π1+3 =
(c+ 2b) (c+ 4b)2
¡
c2 + 7cb+ 8b2
¢2 ϑ2a2
2ψ2
− (2− θc)K, (C.9)
π2 = π4 =
(c+ 4b)2 ϑ2b
¡
2c4 + 23c3b+ 98c2b2 + 192cb3 + 128b4
¢
a2
2ψ2
−K. (C.10)
The profitability of a second cross-border merger, i.e., a merger between firms 2 and
4, are determined by a comparison of (C.1) and (C.10). It turns out that a second merger
is profitable if K > eK, where eK := 2z
θc
, (C.11)
where
z :=
a2b2A
2Λ2Υ2 ,
Λ : = −αc5b− 12αc4b2 − 52αc3b3 − 102αc2b4 − 72αcb5 + 648b6 + 1548b5c
+1500b4c2 + 728b3c3 + 182b2c4 + 22bc5 + c6,
Υ : = −2c6αb− 25c5αb2 − 123c4αb3 − 305c3αb4 − 360c2αb5 − 160cαb6 + 2c7
+43bc6 + 355b2c5 + 1472b3c4 + 3312b4c3 + 4000b5c2 + 2368b6c+ 512b7,
and A > 0 is a function of the parameters c, b and α.22
It follows that the market structure with two cross-border mergers dominates all other
market structures if K ∈
³ eK,K´. It remains to establish when eK < K, if at all. We
22We omit the explicit expression of A, which is extremely detailed. It is, however, straightforward to
determined the positive sign of A. Details are available upon request.
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see that ∂ eK/∂θc < 0 while ∂K/∂θc > 0, implying that ∂ ³K − eK´ /∂θc > 0. From
(C.2) and (C.11), it is immediately clear that limθc→0
³
K − eK´ < 0. It is also relatively
straightforward to show that limθc→1
³
K − eK´ > 0.23 Thus, there exists a critical valueeθ ∈ (0, 1), such that K > eK if θc > eθ. Q.E.D.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 4
(i) Comparing (B.4) and (B.5), the market structure with two domestic mergers yields
higher welfare than the decentralised structure if
16b4
¡
92b3 + c3 + 69b2c+ 15bc2
¢
a2
(7b+ c)2 (10bc+ 20b2 + c2)2 (2b+ c)2
+ θdK > 0. (C.12)
We see that this is always true. Comparing (B.4) and (B.6), the market structure with
two cross-border mergers yield higher welfare than the decentralised structure if
−a2 (c+ 3b) b
Ã
Ψ (2b+ c)2 + αν
¡
αc2b
¡
7bc+ 4b2 + c2
¢
ν − 2 (2b+ c)ϑ
¢
(αcbν − (2b+ c)')2 (7b+ c)2 (2b+ c)2
!
+(2 (1− α) + αθc)K > 0, (C.13)
where
Ψ : = 2c11 + 79c10b+ 1377c9b2 + 14 010c8b3 + 92 616c7b4
+417 892c6b5 + 1310 220c5b6 + 2837 016c4b7
+4117 104c3b8 + 3770 064c2b9 + 1940 112cb10 + 419 904b11,
ϑ : = 10 584b8 + 30 780b7c+ 37 188b6c2 + 24 564b5c3
+9874b4c4 + 2469b3c5 + 370b2c6 + 30bc7 + c8,
and ν and ' are defined before. It is easily shown that the first term in (C.13) is monoton-
ically increasing in α, and positive (negative) for α = 1 (α = 0). Thus, since the second
term is non-negative, the inequality in (C.13) holds if α is suﬃciently high. If α is suf-
ficiently low, so that the first term is negative, K must be suﬃciently high to make the
inequality hold. The highest value K is allowed to take in this expression is K. It is easily
verified that the inequality holds for α = 0 and K = K. It follows that a suﬃciently high
23The details of the calculations, which requires some very meticulous, but straightforward, algebra, are
available from the authors upon request.
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value of K (within the relevant range) is always enough to make the inequality in (C.13)
hold.
(ii) Comparing (B.5) and (B.6), domestic mergers are preferred to cross-border merg-
ers, from a welfare-point-of-view, if
a2b
Φ+ αν
¡
αc2b (4b+ c)
¡
8bc+ 8b2 + c2
¢
ν − Ω
¢
(10bc+ 20b2 + c2)2 (αcbν − (2b+ c)')2
−K (2− θd − α (2− θc)) > 0, (C.14)
where
Ω : = 2c10 + 74bc9 + 1182b2c8 + 1180 032b7c3 + 1364 832b8c2 + 905 472b9c
+259 200b10 + 10 792b3c7 + 62 816b4c6 + 245 376b5c5 + 654 968b6c4,
Φ : = 28 452c11b3 + 28 301 024b7c7 + 231 221 376b10c4 + 256 016b4c10
+171 300 096b12c2 + 7883 368b6c8 + 155 414 640b9c5 + 2138b2c12
+1651 276b5c9 + 97bc13 + 71 663 616b13c+ 243 694 656b11c3
+76 655 168b8c6 + 13 436 928b14 + 2c14.
Setting θd = θc, the second term in (C.14) is always non-negative. The first term in (C.14)
is monotonically decreasing in α, and positive (negative) for α = 0 (α = 1). Thus, the
inequality never holds when α is suﬃciently high. When α is suﬃciently low, the sign of
the expression is a priori ambiguous. A higher value of K will reduce the likelihood that
the inequality holds. Inserting the extreme value in the upper limit of the relevant range,
K = K, it is easily shown that the expression in (C.14) is negative. Thus, even for α = 0,
the inequality holds only if K is suﬃciently low. Q.E.D.
C.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Comparing (B.1) and (B.6), we find that harmonisation is not preferred if K > K∗, where
K∗ :=
a2b
¡
Θ+ αν
¡
αc2bν − σ
¢¢
(2 (1− α) + αθc) (8b+ c) (αcbν − (2b+ c)')2
, (C.15)
where
σ : = 2c7 + 50bc6 + 502b2c5 + 2680b3c4 + 8328b4c3
+14 976b5c2 + 14 040b6c+ 5184b7,
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Θ : = 77c10b+ 2605 104c4b7 + 3750 624c3b8 + 419 904b11 + 2c11
+1819 584cb10 + 3446 064c2b9 + 13 264c8b3 + 87 128c7b4
+1215 672c5b6 + 1318c9b2 + 390 892c6b5.
This case is only relevant if K∗ < K. From (C.2) and (C.15) we have that
K −K∗ = a2b −2by
2 + θc (u+ αcbντ)
(2− θc) z2 (2 (1− α) + αθc) (8b+ c)
, (C.16)
where
y : = c5α+ 12c4αb+ 52c3αb2 + 102c2αb3 + 72cαb4 + c5
+22bc4 + 160b2c3 + 480b3c2 + 576b4c+ 216b5,
u : = 77c10b+ 2605 104c4b7 + 3750 624c3b8 + 419 904b11
+2c11 + 1819 584cb10 + 3446 064c2b9 + 13 264c8b3
+87 128c7b4 + 1215 672c5b6 + 1318c9b2 + 390 892c6b5,
τ : = 2c5 + c5α+ 12c4αb+ 44bc4 + 52c3αb2 + 320b2c3
+102c2αb3 + 960b3c2 + 72cαb4 + 1152b4c+ 432b5,
z : = −αc5b− 12αc4b2 − 52αc3b3 − 102αc2b4 − 72αcb5 + 648b6
+1548b5c+ 1500b4c2 + 728b3c3 + 182b2c4 + 22bc5 + c6.
It can be shown that
¡
K −K∗
¢
is monotonically increasing in θ, and K−K∗ < 0 if θ = 0.
It is also easily confirmed that limθ→1
¡
K −K∗
¢
> 0. This implies that K∗ < K if θ is
above a critical level θ∗ < 1. From (C.16) we derive
θ∗ =
2by2
u+ αcbντ
. (C.17)
It can also be shown that eK < K∗ < K for θ > θ∗. Q.E.D.
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